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Climate Change: Why Theories of Justice Matter
Martha C. Nussbaum*

Abstract
Climate Change Justice is impressive, and one of its merits is its serious treatment of
philosophicalissues. Developing its philosophical aspectsfurther will strengthen the argument,
in three areas: (1) the relationship between entitlements and duties; (2) the moral status of the
nation; and (3) the question ofpluralends.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate Change Justice' is an impressive and sensible book. Often books are
sensible but boring, or exciting but implausible. This one, however, is both
plausible and exciting, and it has the additional dividend that it shows real care
about philosophical theories of justice and takes their claims seriously. It argues
well that richer nations owe a lot to poorer nations, but that a certain sort of
*

Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics in the Law School and the
Philosophy Department, The University of Chicago. I am grateful to Eric Posner, Henry Shue,
and David Weisbach for their comments at the Conference on Climate Change Justice, and to
Frederick Watson for editorial assistance.
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Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton 2010).
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climate change treaty, designed to redistribute wealth, is not the way to address
those obligations. Instead, our situation calls for a different sort of climate treaty,
together with independent redistributive measures to address problems of global
poverty.
The outcome Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach recommend is actually
very close to what I think a correct theory of global justice would also
recommend. The philosophical side of the book, however, as regards justice, is
respectful and serious but underdeveloped. It is my hope that developing it
further can strengthen and refine the argument. So it is in the spirit of alliance
and cooperation that I offer these reflections, which in the main will further
support the arguments of the book, though in some important respects I shall
suggest significant modifications.
The theory of justice I defend has other arguments in its favor, and I do
not present them here.2 Since, however, I hold that political justification is an
ongoing and holistic matter, in which we keep testing our evolving theory
against other theories and other concrete judgments, hoping eventually to arrive
at "reflective equilibrium,"' it is a point in favor of the evolving theory if we find
that the theory does dovetail with the sensible conclusions that the authors of
this book reach by other means, in an area on which my own work has not yet
focused.
II. DUTY VERSUS ENTITLEMENT
One section of the book that is clearly in need of more philosophical
development is its discussion of deontological and teleological theories. In fact,
the authors do not use the word "teleological," calling the section, instead,
"Foundations: Welfarism and Deontology." However, the standard contrast that
introductory philosophy classes offer students is between teleology and
deontology; welfarism, which the authors define as the view that one ought to
maximize average welfare, is but one variety of teleological theory. So it will
prove clarifying if we begin with the large generic contrast.
The typical contrast is as follows: teleological theories begin by defining a
good to be promoted, and then, derivatively, define the right (or right conduct)
as that which promotes the good. Deontological theories, by contrast, start with
the right, or right conduct, typically captured in notions of duty or moral
2

3
4

See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabikies Appmach (Cambridge
2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers ofJustice: Disabiity, Nationalty, Spedes Membership (Belknap
2006).
See Nussbaum, Women and Human Development at 111-61 (cited in note 2). Of course I owe this
account to John Rawls. See John Rawls, A Theory offusice 48-51(Belknap 1971).
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusiceat 171-74 (cited in note 1).
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obligation, and then state that the good is permissibly pursued only within the
constraints of the right. The authors do not define deontology, and they offer
only a glancing definition of welfarism, so it is worth pausing to get clearer
about the landscape of possibilities.
The standard definition of teleology is very general, and includes,
potentially, a number of different types of theories. One distinction focuses on
the "comprehensive/non-comprehensive" axis.' One may have a "political
teleology"-that is, an account of ends or goals adopted for political purposes,
without linking it directly to a "comprehensive teleology"-if one holds the view
that political principles ought to be expressed in a way that is metaphysically and
epistemically abstemious, and only partial in extension, in order to leave lots of
room for the holders of different "comprehensive doctrines," both religious and
non-religious, to define and pursue the good in their own way. This is the type
of theory I myself have defended, following the insights of John Rawls, but
developing them in the context of a theory that is basically teleological.' As the
example of Rawls indicates, one may divide deontological theories along this
same axis: some are political theories, abstemious about metaphysics and partial
in extension (Rawls), and some are comprehensive (Immanuel Kant, probably).'
I believe this distinction is extremely important and that the authors ought to
incorporate it in a future version of their project, but I shall have little more to
say about it for reasons of space.
I now turn to another very important axis of distinction. Some teleological
theories define the good as homogeneous in qualitative terms, and thus are free
(though not required) to use the notion of maximization: the right choices are
those that maximize the good. The authors' welfarist theory appears to be of this
type, although they do not make explicit their homogeneous account of good.
Believing that the good is homogeneous, one might still opt for some other
account of the end of choice: for example, a threshold level of good. Still,
historically, at least, homogeneity has been linked to the idea of maximization. If,
however, one holds that the good is not qualitatively homogeneous, as

5
6

7
8

Id at 171-72.
For the terms "comprehensive" and "non-comprehensive" see John Rawls, Podical Liberalism
(Columbia 1993) throughout. Rawls's distinction has ubiquitously influenced later political
philosophy, and I follow it throughout my article Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionistliberasm and
Poliica/Liberaism,39 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (2011).
Nussbaum, 39 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (cited in note 6).
See Rawls, PolidcalLiberalism, throughout, but especially at 12-13 (cited in note 6). Kant's views
are much disputed, but Rawls offers Kant as an example of a comprehensive theory in Poktical
LiberaAsm at 78, 99, 125, and 199-200.
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teleological theorists such as Aristotle and John Stuart Mill have insisted,9 then
the idea of maximizing will not be directly applicable, and one will have to define
right choice in a more complicated way. I myself, like Mill and Aristotle, have a
teleological theory of the plural-variety sort, and, as we shall see in Section IV,
this changes things considerably when we consider policy choice. (I differ from
Aristotle and Mill by being a political-liberal sort of teleological theorist, rather
than a comprehensive type.)
Two more terminological issues need cleaning up. The term "teleological"
is often used to suggest that all choices are merely instrumental to the good, and
that the good can be defined independently of choice and action. Neither
Aristotle nor Mill holds that, and I certainly do not hold that either. Actions, or
in my case opportunities for choice, have intrinsic value, as constituentparts of the
good. So, in my book Frontiers of Justice I do not use the word "teleological,"
preferring the less misleading term "outcome-oriented." Amartya Sen, similarly,
has often stressed that the capabilities that are the central goals of policy have
intrinsic importance.'0
A second term that is frequently used as a synonym of "teleological" is
"consequentialist," and "consequentialism" is standardly defined as the view that
the right choice is the one that produced the best overall consequences." (As
Bernard Williams notes, utilitarianism is but one variety of consequentialism.) I
avoid the term "consequentialism" for my own view for two reasons: first,
because, like "teleological," it suggests that choice is but instrumental to some
consequences independently defined; second, because it suggests that the
account of "overall consequences" takes the form of a comprehensive, rather
than a political-liberal, theory. Sen, who has not embraced political liberalism,1 is

9

10

11
12

For Mill's views about qualitative distinctions, see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 41-62
(Broadview 2011). I discuss Mill's views in Martha C. Nussbaum, Mill between Aristotle and Bentham,
133 Daedalus 60 (2004). Aristotle's views about the plurality of goods are stated in dozens of
passages in his voluminous writings. For two discussions that cite and discuss all the relevant
texts, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragilio of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy 294-97 (Cambridge 1986) and Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy
and Literature56-66 (Oxford 1990).
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Knopf 2000).
See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams,
Utiltarianism:ForandAgainst77 (Cambridge 1973).
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Belknap 2009), although discussing Rawls at length, does not
discuss PoliticalLiberasm (cited in note 6). In 2003, in an issue of Feminist Economics devoted to
Sen's work, I invited him to comment on whether he was or was not a political liberal, but his
response to the papers did not take up that question. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilitiesas
Fundamental Entitlements:Sen and SocialJustice, 9 Feminist Econ 33 (2003), reprinted in Amartya Sen,
Work and Ideas:A Gender Perspective 35 (Routledge 2005).
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less reluctant to use the term "consequentialist" for his own theory, though he
insists that some areas of freedom and opportunity have intrinsic importance.
So, one may have, as Mill, Aristotle, and I do, a theory that defined right
choice as that which promotes the good, and yet insist that at least some of
those actions (or, in my case, the opportunity to choose them) are parts of the
end, not means to the end. Another related contention is Sen's argument that a
reasonable consequentialism should include the preservation of rights as part of
the account of the consequences to be promoted. Sen's view is not advanced as
an interpretation of Mill, but it is, to my mind, the most plausible way of
reconciling Mill's defense of rights with his overall consequentialism. 3 One may
insist, further, that the idea of maximizing does not apply straightforwardly,
because of the plurality and non-homogeneity of the good, a position we shall
consider further in Section IV. And one may hold such a theory in a partial and
metaphysically abstemious "political-liberal" manner, thus not as a
comprehensive theory. Still, the initial contrast between teleology and
deontology survives, albeit in a more subtle form: one may begin reflection by
thinking of the outcome to be promoted, or one may begin with the fulfillment
of categorical duties, and then allow good outcomes to be promoted at people's
discretion, within the constraints of the right (as Kant does).
Some philosophers have doubted that the contrast does survive. James
Dreier, for example, has argued that once we allow things like the intrinsic worth
of actions and the preservation of rights into the account of consequences, then
any theory one likes may be "consequentialized": cast in consequentialist form.14
Technically, he seems on strong ground, but in terms of the spirit of theories
and the way they order the relevant notions, it seems to me that the contrast still
has value, in ways that will shortly become apparent.
One other term used by the authors that requires comment is
"cosmopolitanism." Standardly, "cosmopolitanism" is defined as the view that
one should always view the good of humanity as a whole as one's goal, giving
that priority over local and national goals. Since I am repeatedly described as
"cosmopolitan,"" it seems worth pausing a moment to explain why this is not

13
14

15

Amartya Sen, Rights andAgengy, 11 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (1982).
See James Dreier, Structures ofNonnaive Theories, 76 The Monist 22, 23 (1993) ("The main strategy
for 'consequentializing' any given moral theory is simple. We merely take the features of an action
that the theory considers to be relevant, and build them into the consequences. For example, if a
theory says that promises are not to be broken, then we restate this requirement: that a promise
has been broken is a bad consequence.").
See, for just one example, Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 Yale LJ 1022 (2007).
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and cannot be the case." A cosmopolitan, so defined, has a comprehensive
theory of choice, and thus cannot be a political liberal. Moreover, a
cosmopolitan seems to be debarred from giving personal love, national love, and
other forms of local attachment more than derivative value; they are just ways of
fulfilling locally our cosmopolitan duties. Such is not my view. As we shall see in
Section III, I have a more complex view of the role of the nation. One may
advocate a robust concern for the well-being of people in other countries
without cosmopolitanism, simply by holding that one part of the complex good
that right action promotes is the well-being (in my case the capabilities) of
people in other nations-but it is a part that must be balanced against the claims
of the national, where the political view is concerned, and against the claims of
personal and local ties, where one's own comprehensive doctrine is concerned.
Now let's try to see what difference it makes, in connection with the
authors' project, to have an outcome-oriented theory rather than a deontological
theory. One impressive attempt to give a deontological account of global justice
is Onora O'Neill's." O'Neill, following Kant, holds that ethical thought in the
international sphere ought to begin with an account of our duties, rather than an
account of people's entitlements. Her account of those duties closely follows the
account already given in 44 B.C.E. by Cicero in De Officiis,'" although the
substance of this view is probably also endorsed by Kant, whose ethical
doctrines O'Neill closely tracks. For O'Neill, then, we do not begin with an
account of what people are entitled to receive. Instead, we think about what we
have a duty to do and not to do to, and for, human beings.
No real approach is a pure duties-based approach. For we cannot possibly
say to whom we owe something without thinking about people's needs, as
Kant's example of the maxim of non-beneficence famously shows." The world
without beneficence is not a world that the agent can will-because, on
reflection, he sees that in that world he would lack things that he needs, and to

16

17

18
19

See Martha Nussbaum, The CapabilitiesApproach and EthicalCosmopolitanism: The Challenge of Political
Liberaism, in Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka, eds, The Ashgate Research Companion to
Cosmopolitanism 403 (Ashgate 2011).
Onora O'Neill, Towards justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of PracticalReasoning (Cambridge
1996). For an excellent critique of this book, see Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending
Cosmopoitanism (Oxford 1999).
M. Tullius Cicero, De Officis (Hogan et Thompson 1836).
O'Neill's duty-based approach, similarly, makes at least implicit reference to need, for example, in
its assumption that violence and deception are bad; for, as Aristotle said, such things would not
be bad for gods, who would have no need of promises, contracts, etc.
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which he feels entitled." Similarly, Rawls's Kantian proceduralism begins from
"circumstances of justice" that include the needs of human beings for basic
goods of life, and his account of just distribution relies heavily on an account of
the "primary goods" that all human beings need to pursue their projects."
Duties, in short, are never generated in a vacuum: the idea of needs, and
entitlements based upon needs, always enters in to inform us why the duty is a
duty, and why it matters.
O'Neill argues, however, that a duty-based account supplies political
thought with a clarity and definiteness that entitlement-based accounts must
lack. O'Neill claims that if we begin with people's needs for food and shelter, we
have no clear way of assigning transnational duties. If, however, we begin with
Kantian "perfect" duties of justice-duties not to assault, not to lie, not to use
another as a means-we have (she claims) no problem assigning those duties to
everyone, and everyone can fulfill them. Indeed, it is just part of being a moral
human being to have such duties, so, even prior to knowing anything about
individuals and how they are situated, we can conclude that they have such
duties. By contrast, she argues, if we begin from the site of rights or needs, then
we have great difficulty saying who ought to do what.
O'Neill's account of duties of justice, however, is less clear than it at first
appears-as is the distinction between "perfect" and "imperfect" duties from
which it derives.22 Perfect duties have a specific assignable recipient, and they
bind without exception: they are "duties of justice." "Imperfect duties," or
"duties of beneficence," are duties that everyone ought to fulfill in some way,
but they have no assignable recipient, and thus we have a lot of latitude about
how far and to whom we fulfill them. First of all, however, the entire Western
tradition of reflection about global justice, beginning at least from Cicero, has
understood the duty not to assault, etc., to include, as well, a duty to protect
people who are unjustly assaulted. This arm of the non-assault duty imposes
taxing requirements, including economic requirements, and is as difficult to
assign to specific individuals and institutions as the duty to feed.2 Indeed, as
Henry Shue has argued, the military expenditures required to protect people
from assault, torture, etc., are greater than the expense required to give all the
20

21
22
23

For an excellent treatment of this set of issues, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought 84-110
(Cambridge 1999); and for more information on beneficence and the empirical condition of
human interdependency, see id at 91-97.
For "circumstances of justice," see Rawls, A Theog of jsfice at 126-30 (cited in note 3); for
"primary goods," see id at 90-95.
For a longer discussion, see Nussbaum, Frontiers offustice at 273-315 (cited in note 2).
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Duties ofJustice, Duies of MaterialAid: Cicero's Problemad Legay, 8 J Pol
Phil 176 (2000). A revised version may be found in Steven K. Strange and Jack Zupko, eds,
Stoicism: Tradidons and Transformations 214 (Cambridge 2004).
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world's people enough food.24 So if it is a fatal objection to an account of global
morality that there is considerable difficulty assigning the duties to specific
actors, her account ultimately suffers from this problem just as much as the
accounts she rejects-if she follows Cicero's sensible proposal that extends
duties of non-aggression to include the duty of protecting others from unjust
aggression. 21
Second, the duty not to use people as means-O'Neill's general Kantian
account of "perfect duties"-cannot be plausibly separated from critical scrutiny
of the global economy and its workings, and thus from a consideration of
possible global redistribution and other associated social and economic
entitlements, a central concern of Posner and Weisbach. People can be treated
as means by being enslaved, raped, or tortured. But they are also putatively
treated as means when corporations put them to work in substandard conditions
and deprive them of a decent living wage. At least one needs to make an
argument, if one wishes to deny this. The idea of treating human beings as ends
has been a prominent part of critical reflection about working conditions, since
Marx at least,26 if not before. The related idea of protecting human dignity, as it
is used in modern constitutional and legal thought, is understood to have clear
implications for economic conditions and conditions of work. (These concerns
are at the heart of the account of entitlement in the capabilities approach, which
traces its origins to the early Marx conception of truly human functioning.) It is
sure that many people are being used as means, although it is not fully clear who
has the duty to prevent this.
Furthermore, the notion of using a human being as a means can hardly be
made clear without a related concept of human dignity, and treatment worthy of
it. But that is a concept that belongs to the side of entitlement: we need to have
some sense of what it is to respect human dignity, of what treatment human
dignity requires from the world, if we are to be clear about what treatment
violates it.

O'Neill's account runs into difficulty in two further and related ways. First,
caught in the grip of the Cicero/Kant distinction between duties of justice and
duties of beneficence, she fails to generate any account of duties of material
redistribution. This difficulty plagues Kant's own account. Indeed, the whole
point of Kant's liberal theory of the right and the good was to give people lots
of room to pursue the good as they see fit, within the constraints of a very thin
account of perfect duties. Kant was not just a liberal, he was in this sense a
24

Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US ForeignPoiey (Princeton 2d ed 1996).

25

Cicero attaches the proviso that one can do this, which includes economic feasibility. See
Nussbaum, 8 J Pol Phil at 192-93 (cited in note 23).
Karl Marx, Economic and PhilosophicManusm7ipts of 1844 132-146 (Intl 1844).
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libertarian, and he did not favor material redistribution, even within a nation,
except in the minimal form of charity to widows and orphans. John Rawls uses
the materials of Kant's ethics to construct a much more exacting account of
duties of redistribution within a nation-but in his account of global justice he
remains a Ciceronian: transnational duties occupy the thin Cicero/Kant terrain
of war and peace.27 Posner and Weisbach rightly reject this narrow approach.
A further difficulty with theories of the duty-based type is that they are
typically very inflexible in their assignment of duties to actors. They look at each
agent and ask whether, on grounds of pure morality, that agent has a duty to
perform a certain action-rather than thinking of agents as shouldering, in
various and often flexible ways, the job of producing a good end product. This
flexibility is rightly seen by Posner and Weisbach as a desideratum in a theory of
global justice.28
What is the upshot for the authors' project? Posner and Weisbach argue
convincingly that we do have duties of material redistribution in the
transnational context. I hope to have shown here, however, that a standard
account that begins from the notion of duty is unable to explain or justify those
duties. Insofar as it assigns duties at all, it does so in an inflexible way, and that
sort of inflexibility is rightly viewed with skepticism by the authors. This result
won't disappoint the authors, because they are consequentialists, not Kantians,
but it is worth stating clearly.
By contrast, theories of an outcome-oriented sort begin with the outcome
to be promoted. If they include an idea of urgency or entitlement, they may even
say, the reason this outcome is the one to focus on is that people have a right to
these things, or an entitlement to these things, or urgent needs for these things,
or an expectation grounded in human dignity that they would have these things,
or some other such account. (Thus, although the notion of a right is often
associated with deontological theories, it is perfectly at home in theories of an
outcome-oriented or even a welfarist sort, as Sen showed long ago.2 The
outcome to be promoted, in such a theory, is the one in which people have what
their human dignity requires, or their entitlements are fulfilled. (That may be
only a partial account of the good to be promoted-for example it may not
include peace and security, very important goods-but the fulfillment of
entitlements will be a very central part of the good.)

27

See John Rawls, The Law ofPeoples (Harvard 1999).

28

Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 169-70 (cited in note 1) (arguing that good
judgments are rightly seen as contextual, depending on "existing institutions and the behavior of
other nations").
Sen, 11 Phil & Pub Aff at 3 (cited in note 13).
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Saying this much about the good shows us already that there are duties, for
rights and entitlements are correlative with duties. If X has a right to Y, someone
has a duty to promote Y for X. But we can state the entitlements side and
describe them rather precisely, without being at all clear about who may have
those duties and when, and certainly, also, without holding that the assignment of
duties is fixed and inflexible. Indeed, theories of an outcome-oriented type will
usually prize flexibility in the assignment of duties: for if the whole point is to
make sure that people get what they are due, we should surely prefer the
arrangement that does this best.
My own view suggests that we therefore begin with a specification of a
threshold of entitlement that seems commensurate with the respect we have for
human dignity, and that seems inherent in the idea of a life worthy of people's
human dignity. The Ten Central Capabilities that I have long defended" are
supposed to be a specification of that notion, which can and should be further
specified in accordance with national and global circumstances. The list itself
already makes forward reference to the idea of duties, since it is supposed to be
aspirational and yet feasible: thus we must first inform ourselves about what may
be possible. Having set out the goal, we conclude right away that we are all (as
citizens of the world) under a collective responsibility to fulfill that goal. We think of
our responsibility as forward-looking, and as generated by the goal. Thus, as the
authors recommend, and as Iris Marion Young eloquently argued in her final
book, Responsibility for Justice, we do not see duties as generated by previous bad
conduct and do not waste time pinning blame on people.' Instead, we see the
question of duties as that of shouldering a burden looking to the future. And
that means that it is simply natural, as a next step, to look around the world at
the capacities of different structures-nations, corporations, individuals,
NGOs-and to favor the allocation of duties that seems most likely to fulfill the
goal, given the actors we have on the scene. It is rather like casting a play: we
have a script, and we have some auditioners, and we assign each one the role or
roles that seem to promise the best performance.
Thus, an outcome-oriented approach of the type I recommend generates a
flexible and comparative approach of the sort that Posner and Weisbach
recommend: "[I]f redistribution is the goal, one should make comparisons of the
different ways of redistributing wealth and choose the best."32 I would, however,
rather say that it is capabilities that are the goal, and redistribution a means to
achieve those goals.
0

See Appendix for the list.

31 See Iris Marion Young, Responsibity for Jusice (Oxford 2011). Young's example is in fact
32

responsibility for environmental quality.
Posner and Weisbach, Cimate ChangeJusce at 97 (cited in note 1).
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In such an approach it is entirely perverse to carve off one part of the goal
and to try to promote that in an isolated way, before figuring out what the whole
package of goals is and what strategies would best deliver the whole package. To
pursue my metaphor, that is like casting a role with a particular actor, just
because she has a very aggressive agent, and not looking ahead to how this
affects the totality of the casting, the interactions among the players, and the
overall success of the production. The authors are entirely correct that pressure
for a particularly stringent type of climate agreement, without considering the
totality of global goals and the overall best strategies for achieving these, is
counterproductive and not what justice recommends. Of course, ultimately their
own approach will require them to say much more about the entire package of
goals and ends to be delivered. Without that, we cannot easily see how
environmental quality figures in the overall good we are trying to promote.
Here we arrive at a subtle issue I have with Posner and Weisbach, or at
least with their rhetoric. For, although on balance I believe that the best reading
of their book is that we should always operate with an overall picture of welfare
and consider how its different elements interact, they do at times suggest that we
ought to consider environmental goals separately from distributive goals.33 I
believe that what they mean by this is the sensible point that we should not rely
on an environmental treaty to deliver redistribution, but should pursue that goal
by other means.3 4 I certainly agree with them on that point-and yet, their
rhetorical emphasis on separation might lead readers to the misguided
conclusion (which I think they do not really endorse) that we should avoid
framing an overall account of our goal and studying the interrelationships of its
many parts.
III. THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Throughout the book, Posner and Weisbach clearly attach considerable
importance to national sovereignty, but they do not theorize it as part of their
account of justice, telling us why they think it so important. Their preference for
the nation therefore has a look of the ad hoc that might undermine confidence
in their overall theory unless we can say more. Indeed, their very brief account
of the current positions is rather misleading,35 suggesting that we have to choose
between people who think that national boundaries have no relevance for
questions of justice and people who seem to be Hobbesian realists, holding that

33 See, for example, id at 73 (noting that "to a great extent, these issues are and should be separate,"
34
35

and concluding on page 192 that the two sets of goals should be pursued "on a separate track').
See id at 74-75 and 82.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Changejustice at 172 (cited in note 1).
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justice is pertinent only within national boundaries and that extra-national
relations are governed only by norms of prudence.36
This far too simple dichotomy simply omits a view that is both of great
influence historically and, I believe, the most appealing one today: that is the
position of Hugo Grotius, founder of the modern system of international law."
Grotius wrote shortly before Hobbes and therefore was not aware of his work,
but he did attack a proto-Hobbesian opponent who held that there are no moral
requirements outside the nation. At the same time, he argued that the nation has
important moral relevance. How does this balanced account go?
For Grotius, the equal humanity of all human beings anywhere in the
world is a source of important moral requirements. However, he also reasons
that the world system is best organized as a system of nations, because the
nation is a unit that expresses people's capacity to give themselves laws of their
own choosing, a very important part of the human good. He does not even
consider the possibility that a world state might come into being, but today his
argument still has weight, because we still have not seen and cannot have
confidence in any supra-national entity that would be decently accountable to
people and expressive of their desire to give themselves laws. If a world state
were to exist, chances are high that it would not have a high enough level of
accountability. (Even the EU seems flawed in this respect.) This being the case,
we have reasons to support the system of nations and to make sure that it is not
undermined by transnational entities, whether corporations or international
agreements. Any international agreements we make ought to be thin and
decentralized, so as to preserve national sovereignty.
At the same time, we ought to remember at all times that all human beings
have equal worth and all are entitled to well-being (as specified, in my theory, by
the capabilities list). It is in this sense, and this sense only, that national
boundaries are morally irrelevant: they are not sources of differential moral
worth among individuals, any more than are race and gender.
Thinking that all human beings have equal moral worth, we may still
support the nation-state system for Grotius's reasons, and we will therefore
reach the authors' sensible conclusion that redistribution should be done in ways
that respect national sovereignty and are often, indeed usually, channeled
through the policies of nations.
Notice that a comprehensive welfarist will probably think of nations as
having only instrumental importance toward the fulfillment of welfarist goals. I
imagine that is the authors' view. In my view, however, nations have both
36
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instrumental and intrinsic importance. They promote human welfare, but the
human autonomy that constitutes them is also of intrinsic importance and a part
of the goal. I believe that this view is preferable, because giving laws to oneself
does seem to be an aspect of human life that is not merely a means to other
parts, but a constituent part of a reasonable conception of the human good.
Indeed, because most people think that nations are not mere instruments
toward maximizing average welfare, utilitarians typically have to hold that people
should not know the real sources of the principles that guide the public policies
that affect them. For Henry Sidgwick, for example, most people should continue
to believe and be motivated by ordinary beliefs about the virtues and intrinsic
value, and only a few insiders should know the principle of utility, because most
people would not know how to apply it and would be better off following a
more benighted view." I agree with Bernard Williams that this part of Sidgwick
is morally objectionable, because it entails a lack of transparency in the entire
public culture.3 1 I think that the view I hold, which ascribes intrinsic value to
national sovereignty, is fully compatible with political transparency, and is thus
superior as the basis for a democratic society.
People, then, value their own nation intrinsically and non-derivatively, but
they also value all human beings, and seek a world in which all are raised up
above a threshold of capability. This dual allegiance is complicated, but so is life.
Just as most parents think that all children in their own society have certain basic
rights and should be raised above a certain threshold, even though they love
their own children most and want their children to flourish-not because they
are their own special precinct of utility, but because they love them-so too with
the world. We may love our own country most, and even seek more prosperity
for it than for others, so long as we also seek a reasonable threshold level of
capability for all.
Of course this is very abstract and does not answer any concrete empirical
questions about foreign aid. But these are empirical questions that philosophers
are ill-equipped, on their own, to answer. Certainly, as the authors suggest,
foreign aid should itself be given in a way that respects national sovereignty, and
that often will mean allowing duly elected governments to choose how to
allocate it.40 In some cases, however, concerns about corruption should lead us
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in the direction of targeting aid to particular agencies (public or
nongovernmental) dealing with specific aspects of welfare. In that case, we
should, however, respect the will of the nation about priorities and not subvert
those. Thus, we (both governments and their citizens) should not give aid in
ways that accomplish an undemocratic transformation of the nation's basic value
system. (The massive aid given to Hindu Right organizations in India by foreign
nationals, especially by people of Indian origin residing in the US, is a huge
democratic problem, since it supports organizations that wish to subvert the
nation's constitution.)
IV. PLURAL ENDS
Welfarism often treats different areas of life as fungible. Even to speak of
"total" or "average" welfare we need to think in this way: the different goods are
commensurable on a single quantitative scale. But a sensible theory of justice
does not think this way. It recognizes (as did Mill, the greatest outcome-oriented
theorist) that different aspects of human life have intrinsic value and cannot be
cashed out in a common coin. All are important, and none can be replaced by a
large amount of another-if we have really gotten the account of intrinsic value
right.41 just as in personal life, it would be deeply irrational to suppose that an
absence of friendship could be made up for by an especially large amount of
food (indeed, we view it as sad when people compensate for loneliness in that
way), so too in the political life it is irrational to suppose that an absence of
employment opportunities, or religious liberty, can be made up for by simply
giving people a larger amount of physical safety or health care, good though
these things undoubtedly are.
Instead of the idea of maximizing, then, we have the idea of a composite,
all of whose pieces are of intrinsic value, but which also complement and
reinforce one another in many ways. A (to me) disgusting but apt example was
given by the English philosopher John Ackrill, discussing Aristotle: an English
breakfast consisting of eggs, that especially fatty and undercooked sort of bacon
loved by the English, sausage, tomatoes, and cold toast has parts that are
intrinsically delicious (to the English), but that also complement one another in
many ways.42 So producing the right outcome is like producing that great (or
41
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awful) breakfast, and we would never suppose that having five eggs would be as
good (or bad) as having the traditional heterogeneous ensemble. You simply
have to go get some fatty English bacon and some cold toast, and you should
not think that five eggs equal that.
There is, however, one salient difference between human capabilities and
breakfast foods: they have causal properties, so they do not just reinforce one
another, they also help one another come into being. Health contributes causally
to employment; education contributes causally to almost everything else on the
list. Protecting women's bodily integrity from violence in the home enhances
their ability to participate in employment and in politics.
The importance of getting clear about the plural ends that compose the
goal is that we then can work back from that to say how to realize them, and we
can also be flexible about that, seeing how they contribute to one another. In the
process, we should recognize that all the ends we have identified as central have
intrinsic value. Thus we are striving, ultimately, to produce a threshold level of
each one of them. Nonetheless, we can also recognize that some starting points
are more productive, causally, than others. This is the idea called ferlilefunctionings
by Jonathan Woolf and Avner de-Shalit." (They really are talking about
capabilities, as their discussion makes clear, but they like alliteration.) Giring
people capabilities, we should think about which ones will ramify out and cause
the presence of others. This is an empirical question, and may vary with time
and place. I have argued that in many contexts where we are confronted with
gender inequality, producing women's education is "fertile," leading to enhanced
participation in many other areas. Woolf and de-Shalit argue that, for the
immigrant populations they studied, producing affiliations is particularly fertile,
since those solidaristic relationships lead to enhanced ability to struggle for other
goals. So the capabilities approach recommends a close study of the context,
asking always what the most productive strategy is in each context.
This would be true with environmental goals, as just one part of the total
goal set. Thus, the approach naturally dovetails with the authors' sensible
recommendation that we focus broadly on our overall goal and choose policies
that will get us closer to that goal. But, to return to a theme of Section II, we
then need a much richer account of the overall goal set, since only that will help
us see what causal properties other goals have that will contribute to the
realization of environmental goals, and only then will we also see what causal
support environmental quality gives to other goals. (Bina Agarwal's recent book
about women's community forestry, for example, argues that promoting
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environmental quality and promoting women's autonomy and participation are
mutually supportive in the India/Nepal context.')
In one important way, however, it seems that we must diverge from the
authors' approach, if we take plural ends seriously. That is, we must not think of
our goal as that of maximizing welfare, but rather as that of getting people up
above some specified level in all the important areas. As I have often noted, this
way of thinking is closely linked to the idea of implementing fundamental
constitutional entitlements, where we usually take each of them one by one, and
do not think in terms of maximizing the whole set of rights.
We must also, then, regard the idea of Pareto optimality as less than
helpful. There are certainly many choices that make everyone better off with
respect to all ten (or however many we recognize) of the fundamental
entitlements that are our goals. (If, however, our goal is not to maximize, but to
get everyone up above a threshold level, we will not focus on such cases.) Far
more often, however, we will be confronted with situations where improving
people's lot with respect to goal A is in tension with improving their lot with
respect to goal B. These cases call for a specific type of analysis and response.
First, we must recognize that where such tragic tensions are common,
there can be no total ranking of social states: at best, we will have an incomplete
ordering. This is the point that Sen powerfully made with respect to the idea of
tragic choice in On Ethics and Economics, criticizing a single-minded focus on
Pareto optimality as inadequate to the complexity of our task.4 5
I, however, would go yet further: we must recognize that choice in such
situations often involves doing grave injustice-whenever some people are being
deprived of their fundamental entitlements." This means that in addition to
thinking about tradeoffs and doing a traditional analysis of costs and benefits,
we must also be thinking in a different way: about how to prepare the way for a
future in which nobody will face such terrible choices, and in which the
fundamental entitlements of all will be fulfilled. (That way of looking at tragic
conflict was pioneered by Hegel, although it certainly has its roots in ancient
Greek drama, where he found it.) That sort of thinking is very different from
thinking in terms of Pareto optimality, but it is akin in one important way: it
involves the idea that nobody should (ultimately) be made worse off, at least not
worse off than the threshold, and at least not in matters central to basic justice.
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And of course there is one more large difference, to which I alluded earlier,
between the sort of outcome-oriented approach I am recommending here and
the authors' approach: political liberalism. This means that we never ask about
overall welfare, thinking that people's comprehensive doctrines and their overall
sense of the purpose and meaning of life vary. Out of respect for them,
government does not presume to dictate what welfare is for all, not in a
comprehensive way. Instead, certain political goals are identified that seem of
central importance for all, and that seem to be possible objects of an overlapping
consensus among all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines.47
If the authors were to be convinced by my arguments in favor of political
liberalism and plural ends, they would need to make the following modification
in their approach: instead of talking about maximizing, they would need to
identify a set of central goals and talk in terms of a threshold level of each
dictated by basic justice. They would then also need to refrain from making any
comprehensive statements about overall welfare. But in other respects, the
sensible idea of striving to produce a satisfactory overall package, rather than
considering environmental ends in isolation, would remain. Indeed, part of
thinking this way would involve what the authors recommend: good empirical
research about how the different goals interact causally, and thus how
environmental quality impacts other major ends. At the same time, the authors
would need to suggest what level of environmental quality seems to be an
intrinsically good goal.
The specification of each goal and its threshold may certainly be done
provisionally, with flexibility as conditions change, but some important
conceptual matters will have to be settled at, or near, the outset. First, are the
capabilities of humans our only goal, or are we attaching intrinsic value to the
capabilities of non-human animals (or even plants) as well? Second, are we
attaching intrinsic or merely instrumental value to non-individuals, such as ecosystems and species, or are we focusing only on living individuals? Third, what
discount rate are we using for future generations? This third question is
undertaken by the authors, but they are silent about the other two. There is no
space for me to provide my own arguments about these important matters here,
but since they are particularly tentative, and in need of input from others, that is
perhaps not a loss.
V. CONCLUSION: STRATEGY AND NORM
I have talked about setting a threshold that seems to be demanded by
justice, but I have also suggested that this process should be flexible, taking
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circumstances and possibilities into account. This brings me to a final issue
about the book by Posner and Weisbach. The book is about justice, and it
certainly talks in normative terms for much of its length. It is also, however,
about strategy and feasibility, and some of its arguments against alternatives
involve the idea that they have not recommended a sensible strategy. Nowhere,
however, is there a discussion of how issues of justice and issues of feasibility are
connected. Since this is one of the most difficult issues in political philosophy,
and one that virtually nobody says much about, it may be a little unfair to raise it
at all. And yet it is surely important in the environmental context.
A norm should be non-utopian but aspirational. Nobody denies this. Some
(for example, Sen) do, however, hold that the whole idea of creating a strongly
aspirational normative theory is misguided, and that our only legitimate task as
philosophers of justice should be to talk in comparative terms about how things
might be better done.48 My own view is that a suitably flexible and realistic
normative theory is actually very valuable, as a road map that will help us move
toward our destination. I think the authors need to talk about this. At times, the
strategy proposed is pretty utopian, and no comment is made about how the
unlikelihood of realization affects our confidence in the norm they advance. For
example, the likelihood that people will support extensive redistribution from
richer to poorer nations is small for the foreseeable future, and I am not sure
how this is factored into the authors' normative thinking. This whole issue
deserves more study.
It is to the credit of this fine book that it opens onto so many issues of
depth and relevance that what is unsaid is just as stimulating as what is said.
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APPENDIX
The Central Human Capabilities
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not
dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence;
having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of
reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to
imagine, think, and reason-and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a
way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being
able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and
producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and
so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of
freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and
freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to
avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in
general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger.
Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety.
(Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that
can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails
protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social
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interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this
capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms
of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.
This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to
animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control Over One's Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices
that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of
free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the
right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom
from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human
being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of
mutual recognition with other workers.
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